This essay warns that Nigel Biggar's permissive reading of the classic, theological just war tradition is problematic especially when combined with his highly contextual approach to the United Nations Charter and laws of war. Two points are made: (1) As compared to Augustine's grappling with the disordered loves of the Roman empire -including 'foreign iniquity' as an excuse for military action, the animus dominandi, and wars of a kind that generate more war -In Defence of War lacks a political realism robust enough to defend against leaving the laws of war in the hands of the most powerful nations. (2) As compared to Augustine's engagement with why and how secular law must constitute the conditions for peaceable and ordered co-existence, In Defence of War fails to incorporate into its just war reasoning a defence of the legal regime necessary for the protection of international peace and security.
This essay warns that Nigel Biggar's permissive reading of the classic, theological just war tradition is problematic especially when combined with his highly contextual approach to the United Nations Charter and laws of war. Two points are made: (1) As compared to Augustine's grappling with the disordered loves of the Roman empire -including 'foreign iniquity' as an excuse for military action, the animus dominandi, and wars of a kind that generate more war -In Defence of War lacks a political realism robust enough to defend against leaving the laws of war in the hands of the most powerful nations. (2) As compared to Augustine's engagement with why and how secular law must constitute the conditions for peaceable and ordered co-existence, In Defence of War fails to incorporate into its just war reasoning a defence of the legal regime necessary for the protection of international peace and security.
There is much in Nigel Biggar's In Defence of War that I welcome and affirm, notably the need for those who stand within the classic, theologically Christian, narrowly penal, judicial tradition of just-war moral reasoning to refine that tradition and think with it afresh today. With Biggar, I want to defend and develop this tradition not only as viable but needed in our present-day context, despite the plethora of challenges to the effect that it is exhausted and unfit for the complexities of socalled fourth-and fifth generation warfare, and more.
To this end, it is necessary to be clear (as Biggar is crystal clear) that not all just-war reasoning is the same. Modern liberal versions look very different to the earlier tradition that runs from Ambrose and Augustine through Aquinas and beyond.
It is necessary to have the debates that Biggar frames about why positive law is subject to a higher natural law, why retribution is not always contrary to the evangelical imperative to love, the difference between accepting that soldiers will sometimes have to kill and intending or wanting to kill, the complexities entailed in thinking with the classic just war tradition about recent and present-day conflicts, and more. In all these respects, I welcome In Defence of War as a significant contribution to this tradition and its refinement in the present-day.
Yet questions must be asked about aspects of the book. I select two for comment: Augustine's most extreme claims about the moral destitution of the Romans are made in relation to the glory they loved ardently:
They chose to live for it, and they did not hesitate to die for it . . . It was, therefore, this avidity for praise and passion for glory that accomplished so many wonderous things; things which were doubtless praiseworthy and glorious in the estimation of men.
'
[B]ecause they did not love glory for the sake of justice, but seem rather to have loved justice for the sake of glory, they subsequently broke the treaty of peace which they had made'. 5 The Roman quest for glory was not always reprehensible. But
Augustine holds up a mirror to the empire to see where (at least partially) virtuous intent falls into excess, aggression, illegality and yet more war.
Following Augustine's lead, the challenge today is not to denounce concerns for security and the protection of nationals per se, or to exclude the debate about humanitarian intervention as falling outside the just-war tradition -this would be perverse -but to discern whether and/or when these (at least partially) virtuous endeavors tip into vice, notably, unlawfulness, the relaxation and expansion of longestablished rules to delimit the use of armed force, inattention to the due process of law, the prospect of perpetual war, and sometimes a mask for murder.
Now the prominence of this desire in the character of the Romans is shown by the fact that the temples of the gods which they established in the closest proximity to one another were those of Virtue and Honour (for they took the gifts of God to be gods themselves). He prays ill, therefore, who desires to have someone to hate or to fear in order to have someone to conquer. … For we see that Foreign Iniquity has contributed much to the increase in the breadth of the empire, by making foreigners so unjust that they become peoples against whom just wars may be waged and the empire thereby enlarged. 
On the Purpose of Law
Relatedly, just-war reasoning needs due attention to the purpose of law. Augustine was not starry-eyed in his dealings with the law of empire. As bishop, he approached civil officials to intercede on behalf of debtors, got involved in day-to-day legal conflicts, commented on the duties of judges and how well they performed their role, 9 intervened according to the custom of the day to ask judges to mitigate the sentence and to punish more leniently than the laws commanded, 10 offered suggestions about how mediation might take place between disputing claimants, 11 as well as helping 
Politics East of Eden
This brings us to an oft-neglected aspect of Augustine's writings, namely, the demand of the political. Augustine is often held to have had such a low view of human law and politics after the fall that his theology of law is preoccupied with restraining disorder and lawlessness not the directing of societies toward peaceable living. His highlighting of the 'sense of the tragic' with respect to human nature means that he eschews the kind of utopian ideologies that were so destructive in the twentieth century'. 15 There is a sense, however, in which, for Augustine, the natural and educative purpose of politics remains. In Eden, says Augustine, politics is the proper activity of rational beings seeking after their perfection: 'creatures are instructed and learn, fields are cultivated, societies are governed, the arts are practiced, and other activities go on both in heavenly society and in this mortal society on earth'. 16 The essence of politics proper is the bond of concord that unites Edenic human being as social:
God therefore created only one single man: not, certainly, that he might be alone and bereft of human society, but that, by this means, the unity of society and the bond of concord might be commended to him more forcefully ….
17
Natural providence provides not only that humans live within the affection of kinship but also socially and politically. Voluntary providence, that is, which operates in the activities of humans (and angels) such that they may administer societies, practice the arts of healing, technology, education, and such like, under God.
The contradiction of earthly government is that it is both instituted by God for some kind of ordering toward common good and imbued with violence from its birth. ordered co-existence, orienting all things toward 'an ordered concord of civic obedience and rule in order to secure a kind of co-operation of men's wills for the sake of attaining the things which belong to this mortal life '. 18 Ensuring that law achieves this purpose requires constant vigilance because violence is at the core of earthly empire and no wishful thinking can erase this.
Amidst the realities of global politics of his day, Augustine lifts our eyes from the many and valid reasons for deep scepticism about what human law can achieve to the human vocation to politics and possibility that law can still function beneficially in the restoration, maintenance and furtherance of peace. The true meaning of order, like justice, eludes human knowledge yet a pattern may be discerned in Augustine's advocating of how the conditions for peaceable and ordered co-existence may be realized. Peace is referenced always to that which is greater than the immediate interests of a given individual, family or city:
A man's household, then, ought to be the beginning, or a little part, of the city: and every beginning has a reference to some end proper to itself, and every part has reference to the integrity of the whole of which it is a part. From this, it appears clearly enough that domestic peace has reference to civic peace: that is, that the ordered concord of domestic rule and obedience has reference to the ordered concord of civic rule and obedience. Thus, it is fitting that the father of a family should draw his own precepts from the law of the city, and rule his household in such a way that it is brought into harmony with the city's peace.
19
The quality of peace varies. Even gangsters need some kind of peace in order to exploit ill-gotten gains: 'Even he (a robber -EDR) maintains some shadow of peace, at least with those whom he cannot kill, and from whom he wishes to conceal his deeds', from whence he would rise from his lair and raise himself up as a king if opportunity allowed. 20 Augustine's point, however, is that the violence of the state and its magistrates should be different to that of gangsters to the extent because it has a high threshold of necessity and is measured against the requirements of common good.
The purpose of good law is peace, referenced always to the common or greater good.
Biggar's Contextualism
This brings us to Biggar's highly contextual approach to the United Nations Charter and the laws of war. 2974 words excluding abstract.
